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Abstract 
 
This is a study of how the notion of thinking that Heidegger developed in his writing, especially 
Conversation on a Country Path about Thinking, can be read through a Confucian text to 
illuminate transdisciplinarity and how it might be taught. I briefly discuss the eurocentrism of 
continental philosophy, especially its lack of engagement with and respect for an Eastern philosophical 
perspective, then give the background of the chosen Chinese text. I next consider Heidegger’s position 
on thinking and draw insights from how we can both teach and enable transdisciplinary relatedness 
in university students. Learning to think is taken as inherent in the essential nature of humans and is 
a discovery of our own nature, as well as the nature of Being.1 This discovery, in What is 
Metaphysics, and Conversation on a Country Path, offers a way to unconcealment in the onto-
cosmology of the harmony of all Being. It is essential to Confucian thought and to the fundamental 
ontology of Heidegger and, I contend, to forms of transdisciplinary thinking and teaching.  
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Introduction 
The fields of the sciences lie far apart. Their methodologies are 
fundamentally different. The disrupted multiplicity of disciplines is today 
only held together by the technical organisation of the University and its 
faculties, and maintained as a unit by the practical aims of those faculties. 
As against this, however, the root of the sciences in their essential ground 
has atrophied. (Heidegger, What is Metaphysics, 1949) 
The thrust of discussion concerns questions raised by Heidegger as to how we can think 
about and understand the being of Being—for metaphysics operates in a reality of the being 
of being human, not at the more essential understanding of Being as a precondition of being. 
Such an understanding seems more central to Eastern thought than traditional Western. 
The final section will sketch some ideas on what we might use to develop pedagogical ways 
for graduate education.  
                                                          
1 Supported through the generosity of Charles Lam 
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Rooting a Chinese Onto-cosmology 
The approach taken in this work is transverse and transdisciplinary, in the sense of 
redefining barriers and seeking an interpretation that is not only rooted epistemologically, 
but is ontological and ethical (Kupperman, 2010), and commensurate with metaphoric 
rhizomatic form. It is in the Chinese philosophical tradition that I see a rooted coherence 
and worldliness that allow transdisciplinary approaches to flourish and to reveal insights 
that counteract any reliance on the supposed superiority of philosophical eurocentrism 
(Jung, 2013). The eurocentric position is typified in Hegel’s narratives, Lectures on the 
History of Philosophy (1892), showing scepticism and even ignorance of the importance of 
oriental philosophy. Regarding Chinese philosophy in world philosophy, Hegel summarised 
the Analects (Confucius’ major work) as: 
conversations between Confucius and his followers in which there is 
nothing definite further than a commonplace moral put in the form of 
good, sound doctrine, which may be found as well expressed and better, in 
every place and amongst every people. (1995: 121)  
This suggests that the work itself ‘would have been better had [it] never been translated’ 
(ibid). Hel categorised Chinese philosophy in world history as ‘elementary’ (ibid: 125); the 
contribution of the Zhouyi (The Book of Changes) as ‘superficial’ (ibid: 123); and the Chinese 
composition of five elements of wu-xing (fire, water, wood, metal and earth) as ‘all in 
confusion‘. He was no more generous with Indian philosophy. 
Hegel’s discounting of Chinese thought still influences much of the writing on the 
relationship of East and West thought, where it is interpreted through a Western lens 
proclaiming the superiority of Western thought in its analysis and processes. In Chinese 
philosophy this lens of logical order is not poorly achieved; rather, according to Hall and 
Ames (1998), it attempts an aesthetic order by creating novel patterns. In this order, various 
the yin and yang, and the wu xing have to be synthesised in order to generate a harmonious 
whole.  
Heidegger was no defender of Western thinking and recognised the role of the 
language of discourse. He noted that if a dialogue was conducted in a European language 
(German), the ‘languages of the dialogue shifted everything into European’ (1971a: 5) and 
threatened ‘to become planetary’ (2012: 137). Indeed, Heidegger is careful both to 
distinguish yet not impute value in Western and other philosophies, and to call guardedly 
on examples from Lao Tzu to illustrate his notion of thinking, in counterpoint to dialectic 
thinking (Heidegger, 2012: 89). Ma (2008) has claimed that Heidegger cited Lao Tzu in six 
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pieces of his writing and that, in the most extensive of these, suggested that his notion of 
the Way (weg) is synonymous with the Tao (see Heidegger, 1971b: 92). 
I approach the project in this article with this warning yet, in the writing of 
Heidegger and Zisi,2 there appears a clear commonality of onto-epistemology that goes 
beyond binary oppositions of humanity and nature, femininity and masculinity, and East 
and West. At its core, this has compassion for our being as others within the blending of the 
realities of the existential and spiritual. 
In any historical contextualisation, the codification of thought is found in seminal 
texts, and this holds true in Chinese philosophy. The Zhouyi, or Book of Changes, is the most 
important initial discussion of how the way of being in the world is realised, constituting 
one of the five classics of Chinese thought (with Classics of Poetry, The Book of Rites, The Book 
of Document and the Spring and Autumn Annals).  
Confucius’ development of the mystical Zhouyi through social interaction, rooted in 
the functionalities of social being based on familial ethics, offers a practical way to be rather 
than a metaphysics of being. It appears in the Analects and, like the Great Learning, Mencius 
and the Using the Centre, is one the great works of Chinese philosophy and education. These 
are guides to living life through practical rituals in which relationships can be developed 
harmoniously with a relational way of being. The Zhongyong (Using the Centre)3 was 
originally written as part of the Book of Rites. From the twelfth century onward it occupied a 
place of prominence in neo-Confucianism as the last of the four texts comprising the 
foundations of the official government examinations held until 1905. Taken from the Rites, 
Zhongyong is a longer, more complex and philosophical book than the Daxue. Both deal with 
self-cultivation, but the Daxue is more practical, while the Zhongyong is considered the 
ontological grounding of self-cultivation and of the centrality of harmony in the Confucian 
Way. 
What is constant in the development of Chinese thought is learning-to-be as 
virtuous learning; it is about humanity, love, compassion and benevolence (Ren, 仁); about 
living correctly in line with respect for familial responsibility (Li, 义); and, from that core, 
developing a societal way of being. Correct behaviour, at least for traditional Confucians, is 
a set of rules governing imperatives with its ethical roots having resonance with rule 
utilitarianism. Wisdom (Zhi, 志) is relational rather than personal knowing, or knowledge. 
The relational aspects of Zhi are linked to Ren, the balanced way of being within a 
community that defines the role, the being, of the person in a specific position. As the Daxue 
evidences, this is rooted in familial relationships in a model for both community and self. 
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This community, according to the Daxue, has ‘illustrious virtue; to renovate the people; and 
to rest in the highest excellence’. The learned are wise and exemplary individuals (Junzi, 君
子), people of similar intent and action to the Greek Phronimos. Their wisdom is evident in 
their practice and, in this practice, they become teachers. 
Heidegger on Thinking and Releasement 
Heidegger focused not on the being of being human, but an exploration of what is the Being 
of everything. This is clear in Being and Time, where he suggested that only an investigation 
into the fundamental ontology from which all other ontologies must spring, an inquiry into 
the foundational sense of being, yields an existential analysis of Dasein. He stated that the 
‘analytic of Dasein remains wholly oriented toward the guiding task of working out the 
question of Being’ (1962: 38). He thus conferred a special status on humans to review the 
nature of Being. This theme continued, and in Letter on Humanity he wrote that a ‘human 
being is the shepherd of being’ (1998: 252).  
From the quote from What is Metaphysics opening this article, it is evident that 
Heidegger’s view was that formalised and structured scientific4 investigation does not 
illuminate but adds opacity to the essence of Being. This is because failure to concern the 
world in its totality for disciplines can, at best, provide only limited revelations, constrained 
and shaped by the rituals and truth claims of their collective world views. Heidegger argued 
that it is not through science but an ontological understanding, revealed through mood, 
that the totality of Being is unconcealed. He began to offer us a distinction between 
disciplines: inter- and multi-disciplines and transdisciplinarity, which will be developed 
later. From a Heideggerian perspective, knowledge organised by discipline leads to a refusal 
of the totality implicit in the calculative and sanctioned thinking of these disciplines,  
It is in Heidegger’s works after Being and Time that I will focus this discussion, 
specifically his extensive explorations into thinking and willing/non-willing in Conversation 
on a Country Path. In this text, Heidegger offers a process on how we train ourselves to 
think other than metaphysically (1966a). This work is an imaginary triadic5 conversation 
between a Scientist (disposed to calculative thinking), a Scholar (a metaphysical thinker) and 
a teacher6 (the voice of Heidegger as a thinker of thoughts). The focus becomes the 
understanding revealed in the act of the dialogue rather than what is actually said, not in a 
linear manner but through hermeneutic circles. This work has seemingly direct 
metaphorical links between the ‘way’ of Confucianism and the path.7 Consider the following 
extract from the Conversations:  
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Scholar:  From this it suddenly becomes clearer to me how movement on a way 
[Be-wegung] comes from rest and remains engaged in rest. 
Teacher: The releasement would not just be the way [Weg], but rather the 
movement (on the way) [Bewegung] 
Scholar:  Where does this strange way go, and where does the movement 
befitting it rest? 
Its feel and structure have the appeal of an ancient Chinese philosopher seeking 
understanding from a discussion with a Teacher, that is, Confucius in the Analects. 
The dialogues in the Conversation have two central themes. The first is the ‘open-
region’, which is both the place of being and where beings can be with one another in a 
‘topology of being’;8 the second is a critique of the wilfulness of representational thinking 
and ‘a search for a way of releasement from its grip and into authentic, non-willing manner 
of thoughtfully dwelling within the open-space of being’ (Davies, 2010: xiii). This concept, 
especially the discussion of awaiting rather than awakening thinking, creates a 
transformative way of thinking that opens a way to understanding transdisciplinary 
thinking.  
Indeed, there is a certain spiritual feel to Heidegger’s work that might lead one to 
consider an onto-theological stance, a requirement for a cosmological entity from whom all 
is understandable. Heidegger foresaw danger in humanity’s reliance on calculative thinking 
(and its manifestation in machination) that prompted his comment in his 1966 Der Spiegel 
interview, ‘only God can save us’ (Wolin, 1993: 91). 
Heidegger’s conversations try to break from the metaphysical and physical to reveal 
a way of thinking unlike formal metaphysical questioning, but as onto-epistemological 
enquiry. For Heidegger, metaphysics’ failure is that it enquires into the being of human 
beings, not into the notion of Being—on which being is contingent. For him, this ‘Being’ is 
the fundamental ontology representing a thread running through much of his early work 
and leading to his more poetic, even mystical, later contributions (Young, 2002). His 
struggle is hampered by the use of forms of thinking designed for the understanding of 
being in its enframement of a technological way of being, especially the calculative thinking 
that encourages nature, including humans, to be seen as resources in the gift of those in 
power. His insistence on thinking on Being, at the core of our understanding of human 
being, began to resolve itself in language that is more poetical and mystical to understand 
Being.  
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Allowing understanding to emerge, unshackled, from forms of logical, rational 
investigation opens up new realities and new truths. Moreover, it allows letting the nature 
of Being of things come into the context of the present as a totality of Being. Heidegger 
commented that ‘(M)an is obviously a being. As such he belongs to the totality of Being—
just like the stone, the tree, or the eagle’ (2002: 31). This thinking is essentially meditative 
and can be considered metaphorically as ‘the activity of walking along a path which leads to 
Being’ (1966b: 25). Further, it requires a releasement (Gelassenheit) of that which enframes 
and defines the characteristic of man’s nature. Releasement seeks the equanimity9 to allow 
technology into our lives yet also resist it. It creates the context of meditative or ‘inceptual’ 
thinking (Heidegger, 1999), as an alternative to calculative thinking that defines and 
measures reality. 
Releasement is a central theme for the later Heidegger, and is first discussed in his 
Memorial Address for Kreuter (1996a). Its reliance is on the notion of meditative thinking, 
which Heidegger counterpoints against calculative thinking. He argued that meditative 
thinking is as difficult as any other and concerns us in ‘what is closest; upon that which 
concerns us, each one of us, here and now; here, on this patch of home ground; now, in the 
present hour of history' (ibid: 47). It is about contemplating what this might mean to self 
and humanity. It is not willed thinking (and it links to the essence of being, as he discussed 
regarding the work of Nietzsche, 2012), and allows an openness to things; it is open-
systems thinking across barriers and between ideas.  
This might be reframed as transdisciplinary thinking, as it engenders a 
comportment, a way of being, that allows the meaning of change to be. As Heidegger 
reported, ‘profound change is taking place in a man’s relationship to nature and to the 
world. But the meaning that reigns in this change remains obscure’ (ibid: 55). Moreover, 
Heidegger referred to this comportment as ‘openness to the mystery’ (ibid), and that the 
releasement and the mystery belong together to offer ways to take an autochthonous stand 
in the contemporary world. This is to think poetically, this is a way that overcomes the 
representational horizon-bound10 thinking of the philosophy of our revealed world. 
Meditative and poetic thinking allows us to grasp the ungraspable (Young, 2002: 19). 
For Heidegger, education is ontological, to cultivate the student as a learner and 
human being; yet he was unable to unshackle himself sufficiently from his metaphysical 
thinking tradition to explore this fully, notwithstanding his valorisation of poetry. It is in 
this context that I think the Zhongyong can shed light on Heidegger’s concerns for Being, 
equanimity and releasement—and learning as an ontological self-cultivation.  
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Zhongyong (中 中 ) 
The Zhongyong occupies an essential place in the canons of Confucianism. The book 
concerns itself with the notion of centrality-harmony through equilibrium. It is about 
allowing harmony to flourish by personal agency, which is neither necessarily extreme, nor 
timid, nor passive; it keeps harmony on the right course. It is about knowing when and how 
to act with long-term harmony of the cosmos as its ultimate goal. Li argued that harmony 
and Zhong (中 ), or centrality, ‘forms a hermeneutical circle in which the two mutually 
interpret and illuminate each other’ (2014: 71). It is in this sense that the Zhongyong and the 
Country Path are used. In the following passage from the second chapter, the Zhonyong 
explicitly advocates such a balanced approach: 
Zhongni (Confucius) said ‘the noble man uses the centre. The lesser man 
does the opposite of using the centre . . . Using the centre—this is, indeed, 
perfection! The people are seldom able [to practice it] for long.’ (Johnston 
& Ping, 2012: 223) 
Yet, for ordinary people, the difficulty of achieving this is not removed even when there is 
intent, as the Way is only achieved by those who have perfection. This comes from learning 
and being taught, and concerns sincerity, authenticity, honesty, trustfulness and 
genuineness emergent in enlightened virtues (chapter 21).  
There are three critical chapters on learning and thinking in the Zhongyong: 
Chapters 1 and 15, and the resolution in chapter 28. The opening chapter, the most 
important positioning statement of the book, concerns how one might cultivate oneself, 
specifically referring to teaching. The first sentence sets the cosmological tone: 
What Heaven decrees is called ‘nature’. Complying with nature is called 
the ‘Way’. Properly practising the Way is called ‘teaching’ . . . Harmony is 
the all-pervading Way of the world. Reach the ‘centre’ and ‘harmony’ and 
Heaven and Earth are in their proper positions and ten thousand things 
will be born and grow. (Johnston & Ping, 2012: 215) 
Nature is dynamic, in constant change, due to the interaction of its five elements of nature 
and their spirits in human beings. These spirits are: wood, which is Ren (compassion); metal, 
which is Yi (intentionality); fire, which is Li (filial responsibility); water, which is Xin 
(trustworthiness, fidelity); and earth, which is Zhi (Wisdom). How these spirits intermingle 
in humans is a function of individual human natural endowment. Nature is thus joined to 
virtue ‘like waves are joined to the water’. To act in compliance with nature is called the 
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Way, responding in harmony to the wholeness of one’s being in the Being of nature and the 
natural endowment we are born with and, as Heidegger would argue, are ‘thrown’ into this 
world. Confucian harmony is understood not only as a state of affairs but as a cosmic and 
moral order. As Li suggested, as a state of affairs, ‘harmony is a continuous process of 
adjusting differences and reconciling conflicts . . . as a cosmic order harmony evolves out of 
the interaction of various forces and emerges as a guideline for things to operate’ (2014: 
9/10). Harmony is not sameness, but a creative construction of tensions of being in the 
world, and cosmic order is cosmic patterning emerging from the Being in the world. 
This was at the core of Heidegger’s meditative and poetic thinking11 as it is not 
susceptible to a direct revelation of nature. This is because we live outside nature as 
constituted as a whole dynamic system, and inauthentically use it as a resource in our 
anthropologic way of thinking, in our epoch of technology and its systems manifestation: 
consumerism. Heidegger did, however, suggest that the essence of Being and beings can be 
found in Ereignis, the appropriating event. This, for Heidegger, was the primordial 
‘understanding’ as the projection of Dasein, which is always ahead of thematic cognition. It is 
knowing ourselves within the otherness of a presenting world, which is outside the language 
of the rational. This complex but central theme, to Heidegger’s thinking, is quite different 
from conceptual and epistemological cognition.12 It is rather a process of getting rid of 
representational modes of knowing. Heidegger explained: 
The event of appropriation [Ereignis] is that realm, vibrating within itself, 
through which man and Being reach each other in their nature, achieve 
their active nature by losing those qualities with which metaphysics has 
endowed them. (2002: 37) 
This manner of being may be seen in the embracing of the technological way of being, as 
recognised by Heidegger, and represents a departure from the Confucian Way although it is 
returned to through the teachings of those who achieve the Way: sages or thinkers. The 
exemplars are teachers and, as we have noted, Heidegger took on this guise in Conversation. 
Turning to chapter 15 of Zhongyong, it opens as follows: 
The Master said ‘To love learning comes close to zhi志; to practice with 
diligent effort come close to ren; to know shame comes close to yong 勇 
(courage, bravery). To know these three things is, then, to know how to 
cultivate the self.’ (Johnston & Ping, 2012: 301) 
Chapter 15 discusses how these three attributes of being can be used to cultivate self and to 
‘bring good order’ to others. The nine canons offer direction and stability to society. 
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Admittedly, these might be interpreted as inauthentic yet, if taken as fundamental ontology 
as Heidegger proposed, meditatively they provide routes into the social structure into which 
Heidegger suggested we are thrown. They provide a framework for reflection as well as a 
structuring of the world. His hierarchical structure follows the process discussed in the 
Daxue. Heidegger has little to say directly about political philosophy, yet in a lecture series 
(‘On the Essence and Concept of Nature, History and State’, 2015) in which he developed an 
ontological understanding of the State and its people, he proposed a relationship much in 
line with the pragmatism of Confucian thought and suffering the same risk of abuse. 
Both passages illustrate an inherent way of realising potentiality, based on capacity 
to change other entities and ourselves by actions, where the capability can be taught. This 
has resonance with the Aristotelian notion of d ύnamis, as both the power and the potential 
to change. For instance, we need both to want and have the disposition to change the state 
in which we currently exist, but this is not sufficient. We also need the means to do this, and 
the two need to be synchronised. To want to be actually better at something is not sufficient 
to warrant the end one wants. By mentioning nature and Heaven decrees12 in chapter 1, 
there is an implicit reference to a range of realities. In chapter 28, the noble man: 
Honours a virtuous nature, and follows the path of enquiry and study. He 
reaches to the broad and great, and exhausts the subtle and the minute. He 
advances to the farthest point of the high and bright, and fully 
understands using the centre. He revives the old and understands the new; 
he is honest and genuine through respecting li. (Johnston & Ping, 2012: 
353) 
This section makes it clear that to study requires diligence, sincerity and authenticity. 
Further, as will be discussed later, it seems to offer a description of Homo sui transcendentalis, 
to borrow from Nicolescu. 
The distinctiveness of the Confucian text, I believe, lies in the centrality of the given 
Way, a teleology that does not sidestep the notion of being but locates it in the intertwining 
of force and spirit in an ever changing cosmos. This centrality is the basis of the cultivated 
person that is adjusted to fit specific time and situation, so ‘he is in harmony with the rest of 
the world through equilibrium. Or better yet, he contributes to, participates in, and co-
generates the grand harmony of the cosmos’ (Li, 2014: 80). Such an intertwining embraces 
mystery and, seemingly the Zhongyong sets Being in an onto-cosmological sense. It does this 
in a form of thinking more akin to the thinking of the meditative and the poetic. It shifts the 
nature of human being from the individual to the community of others, not in an ontic 
fashion but as a fundamental way of being, as a fundamental ontology. 
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Can A Conversation along the Path Change our Stance on Graduate Thinking?  
The premise being offered here is that there is sufficient ontological similarity between 
Confucianism and Heideggerian thinking to warrant meaningful comparison and insight. At 
first sight this thesis seems problematic. Confucianism is based on a moral praxis that 
defines human behaviour; that is, a human being is a moral being and, at the same time, 
axiological and ontological. Heidegger had no place for morality in his ontological thinking 
and attributed such thinking to the ontic, however both agree on interpreting the subject as 
a non-autonomous, culturally bound (or thrown) way of being, that can yet change the field 
of possibilities in which it acts, further, that it is through human beings that Being can be 
revealed. Moreover, both reject the notion of rationality as the defining attribute of human 
essence, insisting on the inseparability between Being and essence (Chan, 1984: 194); rather, 
they stress the primacy of praxis, although in different ways.  
Certainly in Heidegger’s early work it is difficult to see how the basic premise of 
Confucianism can contribute to its reading yet, especially in his discussion of being as 
releasement, in his later work there seems room for the development of a teleological 
process for revelation to the spirit of the mystical. There are further similarities in the 
notion of and to the non-willing of open spaces that Heidegger referred to in the 
Conversation but struggled to make clear. There are two ways of cultivating Being: the first 
is that human beings are the entity for the revelation of Being, rather than any other being 
(see Conversation, 2010: 91); secondly, human beings are central to the cosmos, and the 
dynamic nature of Being is in the being of change, both inherent and cultivated in humans. 
Perhaps unexpectedly in Heidegger, humans take the central role in noble mindedness and 
gratitude. For instance, in response to the comment from the Teacher, the Scholar replied, 
‘Noble-mindedness would be the essence of thinking and thus of thanking’13 (2010: 97). 
Both Heidegger’s notion of Being and Confucian Dao have a unity in the harmony of 
our being of Being at their core, with Heidegger suggesting that Dao ‘could be the way that 
gives all ways, the very source of our power to think’ (1971b: 92). However, unity is 
fractured when thinking is revealed through methods aligned to different disciplines, 
themselves ‘punched out in the die presses of technical-scientific calculation’ (1971b: 91); it 
cannot be conceived only in terms of knowledge as separates entities, as in disciplines. 
Disciplines structure a world into parts, developing barriers to understanding the whole. 
Nicolescu refers to this as the epoch of ‘technoscience’ (2014), which has resonance with 
Heidegger’s technological way of being where we have lost spirituality in favour of 
economic powers. Such a way of being is evident in the practices and technologies to which 
I refer and include the Research Assessment Exercise9 generally, also annual reviews, 
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league tables and rankings, impact narratives, CVs, performance-related pay, the granting 
of degree-awarding powers to commercial providers, off-shore campuses, student fees, 
expanding overseas recruitment, and Public Private Partnerships. 
Unlike Gadamer’s suspension of assumptions in order to reveal new understanding 
of an assumed anthropomorphic world view, Heidegger sought harmonic approaches 
through a hermeneutical understanding of the being of Being as revealed in the notion of 
Being itself. Certainly, such an approach accepts notions of contextualisation, historicity and 
disclosure through dialogue, but it also offers different modes of thinking through which 
this disclosure can occur. In this sense it offers a thinking for different realities, with that of 
the present through poetic and meditative thinking rather than the dominant academic 
discourse of critical evaluation. This embracing of thinking as being, not thinking as the 
basis of disciplines, opens the debate as to what transdisciplinarity is from a different reality; 
the reality of the non-rational. As Rancière suggested, the poetics of knowledges does not 
claim ‘that the disciplines are false knowledges. A poetics of knowledge is first a discourse 
which re-inscribes the force of descriptions and arguments in the equality of common 
language and the common capacity to invent objects, stories and arguments’ (Rancière, 
2006: 12).  
This is might be explored through a dynamic cybernetic-semiotic system. The 
cybernetic aspect of modelling amounts to envisaging learner-teacher communication as a 
whole feedback loop, where the source of information becomes a destination when it is fed 
back, and where the destination of information becomes a source as it feeds back information 
to the original source. The systemic aspect of this model is that ‘control’ of information in 
such kind of system is distributed and resides in the whole system, rather than just one 
element of it. The semiotic aspect amounts to not reducing the ‘information’ exchanged to 
discrete elements whose value is governed by a fixed code, along the lines of computing 
information, but as signs whose meaning is subject to several intermingling constraints 
(ecological, physiological, emotional, observational constraints) and types of contexts. 
Specifically, the interrelatedness of the contexts means that emotion arises from the 
collective results of a relatively large number of processes.  
Doing so does not evade the importance of pragmatic things or the notion of 
complexity in problems, but does decentralise the powerful hegemonies of disciplinary 
logics to open up problems to investigation by those who are involved. Moreover, this 
opening up to seek harmony is not an opening up to passivity but to seeking cosmic 
patterns emerging from the myriad things interacting within the universe. In seeking 
harmony within the cosmo-ontological nature of our being, we erect a platform for the 
Rooting graduate enquiry and pedagogy 
discussion of problems and the realisation of forms of understanding, enquiry and 
resolution, which are different in form from the fragmentary issues of disciplinary and 
calculative thinking. In so doing, one’s expectation of oneself and of others might change, 
defined in terms of their calculative thinking of having, desiring and taking. Problems are 
not different in terms of the current absolutists’ presence, but are conceived in their 
historical context and in terms of others’ contingencies and their world view, whether 
animate or inanimate, occidental or oriental. Such an approach does not look to hegemonies 
of knowledge to redefine problems away from their context, but to locate them within both 
a local and global context and use the learning from them to inform a wider engagement of 
dialogue; one of emotional, spiritual, tacit, contextual, traditional, tribal, imaginative, 
patterning, reflective praxis rather than one based on transcendentalist thinking. 
So, to poeticise graduate thinking, our pedagogy needs to respect the onto-
cosmology of our being developed through different modes of thinking. Our pedagogical 
practice would be transformative, transdisciplinary and realised as a dynamic cybernetic-
semiotic system.  
 
Notes 
 
1  I have used ‘Being’ where I intend to refer to the Being of everything— the being of Being—and ‘being’ 
when I refer specifically to being human. 
2  It is disputable whether Zisi actually wrote the Zhongyong, but there is sufficient evidence presented by 
Johnson and Ping (2012) to satisfy the author of its authenticity. 2  His book title is translated in a number of ways. Traditionally translated as the Doctrine of the Men, the 
version used here is attributed to Zisi (a grandson of Kongzi), with notes by Zheng Xuan and a 
commentary by Kong Yingda.  
4  ‘Science’ in the German academic sense includes all natural and humanistic sciences.  
5  Also a translation of Chinese San Ho Hui, literally 'three unite society', i.e. 'triple union society', said to 
mean 'the union of Heaven, Earth, and Man'. 
6  It is interesting that, in Conversation on a Country Path about Thinking, Heidegger takes the role of the 
teacher. The thinker is able to converse not from the grounds of science of philosophy, but from a 
position I would suggest is occupied and recognised by the great Chinese ancient thinkers by the 
designation zi. 7  And, of course, Socratic dialogues. 
8  Heidegger refers to this in his work, Four Seminars. 
9  See Shun (2014) for a discussion of equanimity in ancient Chinese literature.  
10  By this, Heidegger is pointing us towards that which makes sense of our understanding of the world; a 
shared background and unquestioned reality of our world that allows communication and shared living. 
11  For a discussion of sameness in Heidegger, see Identity and Difference (2002). 
12  In his note, Zheng Xuan takes this to be a reference to what heaven decrees for mortals through the 
spirits of the Wu Xing; the forces of wood, metal, fire, water and earth; their manifestations in being as 
benevolence, righteousness, rites, trustworthiness and wisdom. 
13  This idea was taken up in by Heidegger in Part II, chapter 3 of What Is Called Thinking? 
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